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EQUALITY AND DIVISION: VALUES IN
PRINCIPLE1
abstract Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem
to think that equality is one such value. Scheﬄer’s contribution to the
symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms
of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social
institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls
can be deﬂected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as
an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status
of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst
elements of utilitarianism (in particular its consequentialism) while leaving
behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press
that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role
of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which
we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality.
I
T alk of values in relation to politics might most immediatelybring to mind ‘family’, or ‘old-fashioned’, and the point
of talking of values in the political sphere might then, quite
cynically, be taken to gain votes rather than understanding. Still
there is a question concerning value and the political domain
which is really quite fundamental to political philosophy and
its methods, even if it is diﬃcult to address head on: Are there
values which belong distinctively to the political domain? That is,
1. I am grateful to Sam Scheﬄer for letting me see the draft of his article ‘Is the
Basic Structure Basic?’, forthcoming in a festschrift in honour of G. A. Cohen,
which contains an illuminating discussion of Rawls’s Basic Structure. For helpful
discussions of the idea of equality I am indebted to G. A. Cohen, Miriam Cohen-
Christoﬁdis, Brian Feltham, Brad Hooker, Mark Eli Kalderon, Niko Kolodny, Mike
Martin, Alison McIntyre, Hans Oberdick, Martin O’Neill, Mike Otsuka, Joseph Raz,
Sarah Richmond, Tim Scanlon, Scott Sturgeon, Larry Temkin and Jo Wolﬀ, as well
as to audiences in Oxford, Wellesley College, Louvain-la-Neuve and Harvard.
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are there values which we can recognize, or at least engage with,
only in the context of social institutions and the expectations they
give rise to? If there are any such values, then one might expect
that equality would be one among them. For we can certainly
make sense of the idea that a just society should aim to be an
equal society, while at the same time it is not at all clear what it
would be for a man to pursue equality for its own sake within his
individual life, quite apart from any social concerns or purposes.
Certainly the claims of equality seem to focus one of the most
interesting and powerful critiques of liberal tradition in theories
of justice that have developed over the last half century. In
Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism, ‘justice as fairness’ is a concern
principally at the level of the basic institutions of society: we
need to fashion the fabric of the social world around us to meet
the needs of all. But Rawls does not insist that the participants in
this just society should all equally strive for equality. Egalitarian
theories question whether this liberal egalitarianism really takes
the value of equality seriously. For this position seems to limit
the virtue of equality or fairness to its political institutions. So
G. A. Cohen presses Rawls in his commitment to an ideal of
equality. He insists that if you leave the task of preservation
of equality solely to your institutions, and do not require that
individuals also care about it, then you do not take seriously
the central claims that equality makes on us. Proper attention to
the demands of equality require us all to be moved to alleviate
inequalities around us, and not merely to strive for the kinds
of institutions that Rawls deems just. Since Rawls focuses the
concern with equality at the level of the basic structure, Cohen
suggests that Rawlsian principles of justice are consistent with a
society stocked with self-interested entrepreneurs. So if Cohen’s
complaint is right, the liberal egalitarian must move beyond
Rawls’s commitments and insist that individuals, and not just
political institutions, pay due attention to equality.
In his contribution to this symposium, Samuel Scheﬄer seeks
to disarm Cohen’s challenge (as well as the criticisms levelled
at Rawls along similar, if slightly diﬀerent, lines, by Murphy
and Nagel—the latter more sympathetic to Rawls). Scheﬄer
proceeds by appealing to a division of values which can be
located within an individual, as well as a division of labour
between individuals and institutions. Individuals will care about
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equality as they care about the welfare of others. But, in addition,
the well-being of any individual requires that they both possess
and pursue personal goals and interests. So as much as impartial
or impersonal values matter to individuals, they must make room
for the central pursuit of their personal goals, and for their
partial concern for those they care for. Scheﬄer suggests that
we can understand Rawls’s division of labour as realizing a way
of reconciling and integrating these two sets of concerns. Our
institutions aim at looking after the impartial values of equality
and justice, and thereby busy themselves with redistributing
resources and meeting needs. ‘The task of realizing the values of
justice and equality will be assigned primarily to what Rawls calls
“the basic structure of society” ’ (Scheﬄer, 2005: 236). Within
this context, individuals can then pursue their own goals, devote
themselves to their partial aﬀections and engagements, without
denying the importance of equality and benevolence. Thus
Scheﬄer argues for a ‘division of moral labour’. This division
of labour is rooted in recognition of pluralism about values,
and seeks to reconcile values that would otherwise come into
conﬂict. Scheﬄer contrasts this view with a conception of justice
and equality which treats them as purely institutional values
and would obscure the appeal and plausibility of a Rawlsian
conception. Hence he rejects Murphy’s view that Rawls’s project
is to make justice less costly and burdensome for individuals, and
Cohen’s charge that Rawls provides a justiﬁcation for ‘unlimited
self-seekingness in the economic choices’ of individuals’. Scheﬄer
also criticizes Nagel’s own moral division of labour, with which
he is otherwise more in sympathy, for attributing the personal
and impersonal standpoint to two divergent aspects of the self,
and for overlooking the variety of non-institutional values (for
reducing them to personal concerns).
So has Scheﬄer disarmed Cohen’s concerns as we highlighted
them above? One way to dramatize a doubt is to ask whether
the division Scheﬄer suggests will result in the requirement
that individuals should care about equality. From the fact that
many people will be concerned to foster the value of equality
in furnishing these institutions, surely it does not follow that
all who are governed by these institutions will likewise care;
nor that anything should be done to make these people care.
And Cohen’s concern is that Rawls will admit as perfectly just a
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society in which a minority of entrepreneurs extract beneﬁts from
the many as long as the society as a whole still satisﬁes Rawls’s
constraints on how the institutions of the basic structure should
maintain equality. As long as these individuals do not act so
as to undermine the order of society, we do not seem to have
anything to criticize in them from Rawls’s point of view.2 Does
Scheﬄer’s re-telling alter this? If not, how has Cohen’s initial
complaint been answered?
I am sure that there is more for Scheﬄer to say at this juncture,
but here I want to open up another avenue for understanding the
division of labour and the status of an ideal of equality. Once we
recognise the idea of equality as a value in itself, then it is diﬃcult
to deny that individuals, and not solely institutions, should be
concerned with equality, and hence that there is some failing in
a society which does not encourage its citizens to care about this
value, that is a society which lacks an egalitarian ethos.3
On the other hand, isn’t there something puzzling about the
idea that one should care about equality as such, rather than
just care for the needs of others? Well, that is the idea I shall
explore here. For, I want to suggest that we can understand the
liberal egalitarian’s position here as one which seeks to maintain
an ideal of equality without thereby recognizing a substantive
value of equality. This suggests an alternative and more direct
response to the egalitarian critique of Rawls. And it suggests that
some things may matter in the political domain without thereby
being of value in themselves—we need to contrast our political
ideals, with the moral values which underpin them.
In his defence of liberal egalitarianism against a variety of
opponents, Scheﬄer contrasts egalitarianism with consequen-
2. The worry that Rawlsian institutions do not require virtues of their citizens is
a criticism that David Wiggins takes up from Cohen, and develops from a non-
egalitarian outlook (Wiggins: 2004).
3. This, I take it, is Cohen’s main complaint against Rawls. His argument against the
Basic Structure is that the idea is either too conﬁned—if it is restricted to the legal
structure, or conceptually vague—if it is supposed to go beyond, and thus to contain
some individual choices within this legal structure. However Cohen’s criticism of
the Rawls’s Basic Structure is aimed at showing ‘decisively, that justice requires an
ethos governing daily choice which goes beyond one of obedience to just rules’ (Cohen,
2000: 136, emphasis added). I shall return to the idea of an egalitarian ethos to
supplement institutional justice at the end of this paper—my suggestion will be that
the attraction of this idea derives its main appeal through an oscillation between
principles and policies.
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tialism. Here, in contrast, I want to highlight a certain parallel
between Cohen’s egalitarianism and consequentialism. One may
ﬁnd this echoed already in Scheﬄer’s strategy. For suppose
that Cohen is unsatisﬁed, as I have suggested, with Scheﬄer’s
division of moral labour, and his attempt to secure a space
for the individual pursuit of a good life. The obvious riposte
back to egalitarians like Cohen is that if equality were really a
value as they conceive of it, then our engagement with it would
be susceptible to the kinds of problem long outlined by critics
of consequentialist accounts of values. That is: the complaint
back to authors who insist on the value of equality is that
they have an objection to Rawls only to the extent that they
present us with a picture which is aptly described in the terms
used by Scheﬄer for consequentialism, namely that they ‘make
room for the traditional norms of personal life only insofar as
their use can be justiﬁed at a putatively more fundamental level
where a thoroughly impartial concern for all individuals prevails’
(Scheﬄer, 2005: 235).4
In what follows, I shall develop this line of thought further.
I shall argue that the particular understanding of the value
of equality that Cohen needs echoes some familiar founda-
tional problems in utilitarian conceptions of value; that both
approaches are committed to a form of consequentialism. But
before I proceed, a clariﬁcation is in order. Egalitarianism is
diverse, and not all egalitarians have the commitments to which
I just referred. Many people consider that equality constitutes
an attractive political ideal, one which is part of the promise of
a just society. We recognize the importance and legitimacy of
the claims that others have on us through political institutions,
and many of these have traditionally been expressed in the
language of egalitarianism. So the concern here is not to attack
egalitarianism as such, but rather a particular philosophical
understanding of it. That is to say, my concern here is to work
out what we value or should value through a political ideal of
egalitarianism; not to question whether we do or should have
such an ideal in the ﬁrst place.
4. Of course in (Scheﬄer, 1982) Scheﬄer has made one of the main contributions to
the signiﬁcance of this worry, and the shape that moral theory may take in the light
of it.
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Consequently, I will employ the term intrinsic egalitarianism
for the view that there is a value that equality has in itself : that
there is an autonomous, impersonal, political value, and hence
that proper engagement with this value may be in competition
with the pursuit of personal aims.5 Egalitarianism, more broadly
conceived, is simply the espousal of a political ideal of equality,
whatever values that ideal is to taken to be grounded in. And
in contrast to intrinsic egalitarianism, I aim here to sketch a
conception of egalitarianism which embraces the political ideal of
equality but denies that there is any distinctive value to equality
in itself. Such egalitarianism need appeal to no more than the
ordinary values that we can all recognize in the pursuit of our
own personal aims. Of course, even on this view, one must admit
that conﬂicts can and do arise between the pursuit of equality
and one’s concern for a good life; but no such conﬂict will
be an instance of a deep division among our values, between
the personal and impersonal values. For on this conception of
egalitarianism, there is no reason to think of equality as such as
of value.
I proceed as follows. I start out from the connections noted
by Thomas Nagel between egalitarianism and utilitarianism,
before turning to the separate strands of ethical and metaphysical
doctrines that the two exhibit in order to isolate some common
traits, but also to highlight some key dissimilarities. The
main diﬀerence between these two doctrines is that intrinsic
egalitarians substitute the intrinsic value of equality for the
impersonal value of welfare within what remains a broadly
consequentialist framework; and this, I argue, is not a welcome
move. In particular, someone who makes this move will ﬁnd
him- or herself committed to encouraging equalization, which
5. For intrinsic egalitarians equality may be instrumental to achieve valuable political
or social goals but it is also a value to be promoted for its own worth. Examples of
intrinsic egalitarians are G. A. Cohen, whose criticism of Rawls Scheﬄer discusses in
his article, and also Larry Temkin (who uses the term non-instrumental egalitarianism
to characterize his own position). Thomas Nagel also sometimes writes as if he is
committed to this idea. (See Section II below.) Of course those who are intrinsic
egalitarians might not envisage their view in such a way that the stress on equality
is what they highlight—the manner in which I present their view is one that they
will not necessarily endorse. Authors sometimes termed ‘luck-egalitarians’ may or
may not be committed to intrinsic egalitarianism. At any rate the debate about luck-
egalitarianism is principally centred on responsibility and choice rather than on the
intrinsic value of equality, and therefore covers a diﬀerent set of issues.
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commitment, or so I contend, is not appropriately explained by
invoking fairness. In its place, my suggestion is that, instead of
mirroring utilitarian theory of value, egalitarians could do worse
than to retake the political legacy of utilitarianism, its political
concern to ﬁnd a response to claims of need of individuals,
and its appeal not to be selﬁsh in one’s demands on common
resources. I conclude by saying that this political element,
common to the egalitarian tradition and to utilitarianism, can
be separated out from the particular theory of value adopted by
consequentialism.
My main suggestion in this paper is that exploring and
developing the political ideal of equality thus understood
might allow for egalitarianism to be individualized rather than
consequentialist, and, to use a Rawlsian phrase out of its original
context, political rather than metaphysical.6 Scheﬄer suggests
that we need a moral division of labour within the individual
among impersonal and personal values. When it comes to
equality, however, I want to suggest that we do not need to
appeal to this kind of division. Rather we need to understand the
division of labour within society as organized such that we can
provide an adequate institutional response to needs, in particular
through political institutions so arranged that they guarantee
that everyone has enough to enjoy safely a life of value.7 The
attractions and the claims that society so organised has on us
can be understood just by reference to what we all value in the
pursuit of our individual goals, without having to step outside
of that into impersonal values.
But now to egalitarianism and utilitarianism.
II
I am not the ﬁrst writer to draw attention to the connections
between egalitarianism and utilitarianism. In his article ‘Equal-
ity’, Nagel notes in passing a similarity between his favoured
6. I use the term metaphysical just to indicate the commitment to a certain meta-
physics of value, namely the intrinsic (and not merely instrumental) value of equality.
7. By needs I do not mean what is sometimes called ‘basic needs’. Rather, I start
out from the idea of need as that which is a requirement for someone to ﬂourish.
For discussions of this way of looking at needs, See (Wiggins 1998: 1–59) and (Foot
2001).
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view, egalitarianism, and a certain outlook on ethical theory,
utilitarianism, or more speciﬁcally, utilitarian consequentialism.
Both conceptions are, he writes, ‘applied ﬁrst to the assessment
of outcomes rather than of actions’ (Nagel, 1979: 117). The
parallel he notes between utilitarianism and egalitarianism is not
generally embraced by intrinsic egalitarians. A superﬁcial ex-
planation of this neglect of kinship would be that utilitarianism
has had a very bad press, so no one wants to be seen keeping
its company. But let me tentatively oﬀer what I think might be
a more charitable and plausible account of why this parallel has
been otherwise left unremarked.
Nagel compares egalitarianism and utilitarianism in terms of
their shared consequentialism: their holding that the rightness
or wrongness of actions (or policies) depends on their tendency
to lead to good or bad outcomes or state of aﬀairs. Now
the rejection of utilitarianism in contemporary political thought
does not focus on its consequentialism, if by this we mean the
simple (but contentious) thought that states of aﬀairs are to be
compared and ranked as better or worse than each other, and
that there is always a reason, or even a duty, to bring about
a better than a worse state of aﬀairs. Rather, objections to
utilitarianism typically treat it as a theory of distributive justice,
and point out, following Rawls, that utilitarianism ‘fails to take
seriously the distinction between persons’ (Rawls: 1999, Sect. 5:
24).8 That is, the counter-intuitive consequences of embracing
pure utilitarianism tend to be the focus in discussions of it, and in
turn are oﬀered as reasons to reject it. So critics tend to overlook
the positive grounds for endorsing it and fail to consider how one
can avoid a commitment to it in the light of them.
Moreover, one may think that these implausible, or
unacceptable, political directions of utilitarianism can be
challenged without having to abandon the appealing idea that
morality (or indeed rationality) requires that we choose the
action or social policy which, of those available to us, delivers
the best state of aﬀairs. Indeed, as I shall go on to argue (taking
8. Rawls also considers that utilitarianism ‘mistakes impersonality for impartiality’
(1999, Sect. 30: 166). This second line of criticism has not received as much attention
as the oft quoted separateness of persons. I shall return to this distinction between
impartiality and impersonality, and in particular to what might be contentious in
attaching impersonal values to state of aﬀairs in Section III.
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my lead from Philippa Foot), it is diﬃcult to escape the appeal of
this way of putting things, unless we challenge the very possibility
of meaningfully ranking overall social states of aﬀairs from best
to worst in a morally signiﬁcant way.
Once we distinguish the consequences, so to speak, of util-
itarianism and the grounds for endorsing it, it becomes easier
to see how one might explicitly reject utilitarianism through
concern with what follows from it, yet still tacitly be moved by
what led to the doctrine in the ﬁrst place. And hence it becomes
intelligible how the constitutive, formal consequentialism of
many contemporary theories becomes invisible. (To repeat: by
consequentialism I mean the idea that morality requires that
we should bring about the best outcome of those available to
us. Properties of states of aﬀairs are thus the primary end of
our actions.) For those who ﬁnd the ranking of state of aﬀairs
an appealing way of thinking about what morality requires
while also recognizing diﬃculties with utilitarian political and
distributive principles, it becomes tempting to leave foundational
consequentialism unquestioned, and instead to seek to avoid
the problematic aspects of utilitarianism by an appeal to, for
example, individualistic side-constraints. The resulting theory
thus remains consequentialist at heart, while being held up as
a departure from utilitarianism. This, I hypothesize, is the main
reason why those contemporary defenders of the moral worth
of equality (those who are committed to the thought that, other
things being equal, the best action or policy is that which brings
us closest to an outcome in which equality obtains) do not term
themselves consequentialists. And this is why they ignore the for-
mal similarities with consequentialist reasoning in their theories.
Let us be a little more precise about what egalitarian
consequentialism with side-constraints is. An ‘unconstrained’
consequentialist egalitarian would be committed to the thought
that the right action, the right social policy, is that which, out
of those available to us, brings us closest to a valuable state of
aﬀairs, equality. But, anyone attracted to this form of deﬁnition
of egalitarianism will swiftly qualify it. The most salient way in
which intrinsic egalitarians have modiﬁed this is simple model
is in order to take into account the role that desert might play
in distribution. And in addition, they will insist that we need
not conceive of equality as the only intrinsic value: other values
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come into conﬂict with equality. (Standardly, this is held of
liberty.) Hence the need to appeal to side-constraints. So a more
precise formulation of egalitarian consequentialism is this: the
right action, or the right social policy, is that which, out of
those available to us, and subject to whatever restrictions need be
imposed in order to respect other values such as liberty, brings
us closest to a state of aﬀairs in which people are rendered as
equal as possible.
How does this relate to G. A. Cohen? He describes his own
theoretical attitude thus:
I take for granted that there is something which justice requires
people to have equal amounts of, not no matter what, but
to whatever extent is allowed by values which compete with
distributive equality; and I study what a number of authors who
share that egalitarian view have said about the dimension(s) or
respect(s) in which people should be made more equal, when
the price in other values of moving toward greater equality is
not intolerable. . . . An equalisandum claim speciﬁes that which
ought to be equalized, what, that is, people should be rendered
equal in. A qualiﬁed or weak equalisandum claim says that they
should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject to
whatever limitations need to be imposed in deference to other
values . . . [M]ine will be a weak proposal . . . (Cohen, 1989: 906ﬀ)
This seems to be just an expression of what we have outlined
as intrinsic egalitarianism with side-constraints, committed to
(i) identifying fundamental respects in which it is good that
people be made equal, and (ii) balancing and adjudicating the
claims of this value against other values also to be promoted.
This picture also seems to be what Nagel has in mind when he
presents us with the task of assessing how much overall goodness
would be brought about by an appropriate combination of values
to be promoted:
If equality is in itself good, then producing it may be worth a
certain amount of ineﬃciency and loss of liberty . . . (Nagel, 1979:
108)
In contrast to classical utilitarianism, then, I will assume that
intrinsic egalitarianism espouses a plurality of values, but still
focuses on the centrality of equality: intrinsic egalitarianism
presses that we must recognise or promote equality as a value,
April 29, 2005 Time: 10:54am darde.tex
the division of moral labour 265
while adjudicating its claims relative to other values. But of
course, as I indicated above, I don’t think this is the only or the
best way of conceiving of egalitarianism as a political doctrine.
So before I proceed, let me conclude this section by highlighting
two of the ways in which one might question this conception of
the moral value of equality.
(i) Although it may be common to conceive of liberty and
equality as distinct and conﬂicting values, this is not the
only way of conceiving the relation between them. A long
tradition envisages liberty as something we care about, and
as of deep importance to us, but which needs to be protected
through political equality. On this way of viewing things,
equality is nothing but instrumental.
(ii) In as far as equality is treated as a fundamental, intrinsic,
moral value to be promoted, it is not distinctively political.
Again, there is an alternative, long-standing, and speciﬁcally
political ideal of equality which is elaborated by reference
not to any outcome (with its corresponding additive model of
moral considerations or reasons), but rather by reference to
the legitimate claims that others have on us through political
institutions.
What this suggests is the existence of two rival conceptions
of equality, what I called consequentialism with side-constraints,
and a more political conception. But in order to separate these
two strands within egalitarianism we need to gain a better
understanding of what draws intrinsic egalitarians to conse-
quentialism. I turn to this task in the next section.
III
We saw that for some key contemporary exponents of
egalitarianism the right action, the right social policy, is that
which, out of those available to us, and subject to whatever
restrictions need be imposed in order to respect other values,
brings us closest to a state of aﬀairs in which people are rendered
as equal as possible. In embracing this view, these theorists
commit themselves to two contentious theoretical tenets, namely
(i) the intrinsic worth of equality and thereby (ii) the acceptance
of various formal aspects of consequentialism. These two aspects
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may be combined with a third, namely a maximizing model of
moral considerations (according to which one should bring about
more rather than less good). On the resulting view what is to be
maximized is the degree to which people are rendered equal.
The ﬁrst elements of utilitarianism to highlight in comparison
are those which make it a distinctive ethical and metaphysical
doctrine. These are (i) its postulating the intrinsic worth of
well-being and, consequently, (ii) its commitment to consequen-
tialism. That is: the utilitarian supposes that goodness, utility,
or welfare, suitably aggregated, are what morality requires
that we should bring about. This goes together with the idea
that the property through which we establish a comparison
and a ranking of policy options is welfare conceived as a
property of states of aﬀairs as such. The conception of welfare
involved in this account is that of an impersonal value, a value
attached directly to the outcome brought about, in contrast to
a conception of the welfare of particular individuals, and how
some things can thereby be good for a given individual.
I mentioned earlier that political philosophers have tended
to concentrate on the counterintuitive consequences which stem
from unrestricted aggregative considerations. In response, they
have placed limits on what can be done to each person in
pursuit of the greater overall social good. But the adoption of a
deontological framework (in order that fundamental individual
rights should not be violated in pursuit of the overall social
good) leaves untouched the idea that there is such a thing as the
goodness of states of aﬀairs to be promoted through individual
actions or policy-making.
In contrast, anti-consequentialists such as Foot have opted for
a diﬀerent strategy; one which investigates the intuitive grounds
for endorsing the starting point. In particular, they point out
against this conception of overall goodness that thus having to
protect individuals against pursuing (relentlessly) the best state of
aﬀairs should give us pause. (That is to say: when we understand
the best state of aﬀairs precisely as that which promotes things
which are good for individuals.) They therefore treat counter-
intuitive consequences of this perspective as a symptom of a prior
mistake, and they suggest that an earlier and more fundamental
departure from the consequentialist framework is called for.
More importantly, Foot and others have called into question
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the very reliance on the meaningfulness of ranking overall social
states of aﬀairs from best to worst from an impersonal perspective
(the perspective of a supposed shared end). ‘Consequentialism in
some form’, Foot writes, ‘follows from the premiss that morality
is a device for achieving a certain shared end. But why should we
accept this view of what morality is and how it is to be judged?
Why should we not rather see that as a consequentialist assump-
tion, which has come to seem neutral and inevitable only in so
far as utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism now
dominate moral philosophy?’ She suggests that we ask ourselves
who is supposed to have this end, and concludes with a chal-
lenge: ‘Perhaps no such shared end appears in the foundations
of ethics, where we may rather ﬁnd individual ends and rational
compromises between those who have them.’ (Foot, 1985).
Utilitarians posit a value (welfare of states of aﬀairs as
opposed to welfare of an individual) which, according to critics
such as Foot, we have no reason to believe exists. Of course, a
speciﬁc commitment to welfare as a property of state of aﬀairs
need not be part of egalitarianism. But the commitment to
ranking outcomes of actions as better or worse, which is the
consequentialist aspect of utilitarianism, is present in intrinsic
egalitarianism, as we saw above.
Of course to this complaint of Foot’s one might respond with
puzzlement: ‘What’s so wrong about aiming at good states of
aﬀairs?’ What is there to object to in the idea of good (and thus
better or worse) states of aﬀairs? It is obvious that we aim at
good things; the adjective good can qualify a great diversity of
things. Why should the idea of good states of aﬀairs be any more
puzzling than, say, there being good shoes or good manners?
This is not the place to provide a full exegesis of Foot’s
position. However exploring her resistance a little more will
help to underline what is controversial in the consequentialist
conception of the goodness of state of aﬀairs. So it is worth
trying to spell out more exactly where consequentialist reasoning
is supposed by her to be creative or controversial. So, the
consequentialist is liable to recommend to us that:
(i) We value a good, Fness.
(ii) A state of aﬀairs a feature of which is the realization of
Fness is, to that extent, a good state of aﬀairs.
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(iii) A state of aﬀairs in which there is more rather than less of
Fness is, at least in that respect, a better state of aﬀairs.
(iv) Of those available to us, we should bring about the best
state of aﬀairs.
None of the moves from (i) to (ii), or (ii) to (iii), or (iii) to
(iv) is uncontroversial, nor do they just follow from the idea
of a good. By the end of the list, the good at which we aim
also has to play a key role in evaluating the resulting action;
it becomes a measure of whether we have acted rightly. Now
to make goodness do this kind of work is to attribute to it a
new role in our conception of value and practical reasoning,
and one which doesn’t simply follow from our use of the word
‘good’ when applied to such things as shoes and manners. The
consequentialist and her opponent can agree about our aiming
at a range of good things. But what is at issue between them
is the way in which the goodness of states of aﬀairs provides a
diﬀerent kind of reason. This conception of goodness does not
parallel the way in which we talk about good shoes or good
manners, for it introduces the output of practical reasoning as
if it were an (additional) input. In other words: this conception
of a way in which a state of aﬀairs can be good already brings
with it a consequentialist conception of how actions are to be
evaluated.
Now we can see that the intrinsic egalitarian conceives of the
value of equality as being a property of states of aﬀairs: for
a situation will exemplify equality (as they conceive of it) only
when the individuals within it stand in certain relations to each
other. So for the intrinsic egalitarian, equality couldn’t be simply
a property of individuals or of goods (unlike welfare). But as we
have just seen the worry with goodness as a property of states
of aﬀairs that Foot raises doesn’t turn solely on this being an
attribute of a certain kind of entity, namely a state of aﬀairs.
Rather the concern arises when the value in question bears on
practical reasoning in a novel way. So the question is: does the
intrinsic egalitarian think of the equality of state of aﬀairs as
policing our options for action, as the utilitarian thinks of the
welfare of state of aﬀairs as doing so? I think the best strategy for
addressing this question is ﬁrst to put it in the context of a line
of thought which is liable to make consequentialism in general
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seem to be inevitable as our theory of value. In particular, I
have in mind the attractiveness of a maximizing conception of
rationality.
We can approach the matter by envisaging the maximization
of rightness. For some, rightness is an essentially distinct form of
assessment of actions and policies from wrongness. For example,
according to Scanlon, wrongness is what would be disallowed by
any principle that people moved to ﬁnd principles for the general
regulation of behaviour could not reasonably reject. (Scanlon,
1998) If one adopts this perspective, wrongness has a deﬁnite
status which is not matched by rightness: there need be no such
thing as the right thing to do. After all, it may be that there are
an indeﬁnite number of ways of acting, any of which would be
an answer to the question ‘What shall I do?’, and all of which
would be right just in the sense of not being wrong for one to do.
However there is something very attractive about a conception
of practical reason which centres on the possibility of there
being (always, or for the most part) a determinate answer to
the question ‘What to do?’ and, in that case, rightness rather
than wrongness will be centre stage, with the focus on what
you have most reason to do: the right action or policy, all
things considered. (Here ‘all things considered’ stands for overall
burdens and beneﬁts which befall individuals.) And this might go
hand in hand with a maximizing conception. Other things being
equal, if you can produce some good rather than none, then
surely morality and even rationality demand that you choose
that course of action which maximizes goodness. The picture
I propose is that a fundamental appeal of a consequentialist
account of reasoning lies in this maximizing conception
of practical rationality. This second aspect is completely
independent from welfare: rather than being focused on any
particular end of practical reason, it is concerned with its form.
And if one embraces it, it might seem to make consequentialism
inevitable. So one might think that this is what some intrinsic
egalitarians who are not utilitarians are responsive to.9
We are now in a better position to see what the connection
between intrinsic egalitarianism and consequentialism might be.
9. Note that this is not to say that the ethos of maximizing leads unavoidably to
consequentialism.
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The two concerns discussed above can be combined in order
to explain the consequentialism of intrinsic egalitarianism. We
saw that intrinsic equality is not a property which individuals
or group of individuals have. All the same, just because it is
a property of state of aﬀairs it doesn’t mean that it does play
the same role as goodness does within consequentialism. Indeed,
thinking from the perspective of a plurality of values, one might
think that equality just forms one of the considerations into
what one ought to do. In accord with this, we saw earlier that
intrinsic egalitarians conceive of the goodness of equality as
just one among the many considerations which bear on what
makes an action right, rather than that in terms of which
actions are evaluated as better or worse. So far one might
conceive of someone who aﬃrms the value of equality but still
rejects consequentialism, in embracing a plurality of values, with
equality just one among the goods we pursue. But, in fact, this is
not the position intrinsic egalitarians occupy for the way in which
other values are conceived as bearing on the claim of equality
is only as side-constraint; and the model of egalitarianism with
side-constraints treats values as if they are that relative to which
actions are better or worse. (Rather than, those things a concern
for which ought to move us to act, or those things which are
input into our deliberation.) Egalitarians, that is, seem to suggest
that equality is that through which we measure the success of
policy-making. It may not follow from identifying a property
of states of aﬀairs, such as the equality realized within them,
as something of value that a theorist is thereby committed to a
consequentialist understanding of how that value bears on right
action. Nonetheless, we can see that intrinsic egalitarians have
in fact embraced the further move, and conceive of the way in
which equality in states of aﬀairs polices our actions on the same
model as utilitarians conceive of welfare of states of aﬀairs doing
so. That is, that states of aﬀairs are better or worse in terms of
their closeness to perfect equality, modulo the side-constraints
imposed.
Let us take stock. So far I have highlighted possible common
consequentialist and/or maximizing threads which might be
running through utilitarianism and some forms of intrinsic
egalitarianism. But there is a deﬁnite and important diﬀerence
between them, a diﬀerence located in their theory of value. For
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their main point of disagreement lies in the value in the world
which is to be promoted, and with reference to which outcomes
can be compared and ranked from best to worst.
It is helpful to set this disagreement in the context of the polit-
ical impulses that have been associated with utilitarian thought.
In terms of its recommendations regarding policy-making, utili-
tarianism starts from an immediate political concern, namely the
concrete suﬀerings and deprivations of individuals. The specif-
ically political view of utilitarianism, put very roughly, would
be this: there is something which has an immediate pull on us,
namely claims of need, and one must be responsive to it through
building a society which is properly attentive to the well-being
of individuals. An insistence on the virtue of beneﬁcence, the
appeal not to be selﬁsh in one’s demands on common resources,
and the impulse to ﬁnd a formula which properly arbitrates
between needs of individuals in the best or most reasonable
way, are all consequences of this original political concern.
To call this aspect of utilitarianism political is meant to
underline how, in its early development, utilitarianism should
be understood as having been a social movement in which people
were moved, in a particular social setting of limited available
resources, by claims of need of others, and so sought a doctrine
within which to articulate their responses to those claims; and
we can make sense of many of the views they put forward in
terms of how they hoped to arrange the main social institutions
in order to be properly responsive to those claims. This is surely a
more plausible explanation of the huge impact that early radical
utilitarianism had on political thought, and political discourse
more broadly, in contrast to any account which hypothesizes
that people were in the grip of some aspect of abstract ethical
thought.
In turn, this suggests that we can make sense of how people
can be moved to political action by certain political messages,
without necessarily being in the grip of any speciﬁc ethical
picture. So, in looking at the history of utilitarian writings, one
might wish to separate out the political picture of utilitarianism,
the way in which it drew quite wide support, from what one
might call more strictly philosophical utilitarianism. Although
the latter might be the only coherent philosophical account of
all the claims that a utilitarian makes, still it may not best
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explain the initial political impulse. Instead we might seek to
distil the following political legacy of utilitarianism away from
its philosophical consequences: the insistence on principles of
distribution and of social policy which can negotiate claims of
needs others have on us, in a context of scarcity of shared
resources.
Now this political impulse is equally present in a very
long tradition of egalitarian thought. One way of putting the
main thesis of this paper is that this distinctively political
element, present in both egalitarianism and utilitarianism, can be
separated out from particular ethical doctrines, and in particular
the theory of value adopted by consequentialists.
As we have stressed, intrinsic egalitarians do not take this
route. The focus of their concern is at the level of the theory
of value and not that of the discussion of political messages
or impulses. They retain the formal consequentialist aspects of
utilitarianism, but substitute the value of equality in the place
of the impersonal value of welfare. Yet even if philosophical
utilitarianism is creative in positing welfare as a value of states
of aﬀairs which measures the rightness of our actions; the idea
of welfare it exploits is still at least partially intelligible in
termsof the welfare of individuals and our feelings of benevolence
towards them. In contrast, taking bare equality as a value is
to substitute something which has no independent appeal at an
individual level and so ought to be seen as mysterious when
conceived as a valuable feature of states of aﬀairs. Consequently
it seems to me that the intrinsic egalitarian’s point of departure
from utilitarianism is not particularly welcome. To this I turn in
the next section.
IV
I noted at the beginning of the previous section that there
were two contestable theses to which contemporary intrinsic
egalitarianism is committed, namely the moral worth of equality
and a form of consequentialism. Taken together, these deﬁne a
ranking of state of aﬀairs from best to worst in virtue of how
equal people are. We saw some signiﬁcant formal similarities
with utilitarianism, but also an important contrast, namely
that well-being is replaced by equality. The precise contrast is
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this: One might think that the impersonal value of overall welfare
can be understood in terms of, or derived from our conception
of how things can be good for individuals, how things can be
of value to particular persons. However we cannot understand
equality in this way; rather it can only be understood as being
directly posited as an independently valuable state of aﬀairs, as
was noted many years ago by T. M. Scanlon:
Beyond . . . instrumental arguments, fairness and equality often
ﬁgure in moral arguments as independently valuable states of
aﬀairs. So considered, they diﬀer from the ends promoted in
standard utilitarian theories in that their value does not rest on
their being good things for particular individuals: fairness and
equality do not represent ways in which individuals may be better
oﬀ. They are, rather, special morally desirable features of states
of aﬀairs or social institutions. (Scanlon, 1978; stress in original.)
Here, as later in his ‘Diversity of Objections to Inequality’,
Scanlon’s position is that the moral case for intrinsic equality
would seem less urgent if other ends, such as humanitarian
or anti-domination concerns (to which equality is instrumental)
were achieved. There might be an important role to be played by
a moral idea of substantive equality beyond the values to which
equality is instrumental, but, he writes ‘it remains unclear exactly
what that idea would be’ (Scanlon, 2002: 57).
However we may press the oddity of ranking states of aﬀairs
with regard to how equal people are made in them just a step
further. For intrinsic equality is not only diﬃcult to spell out
precisely; there is, on reﬂection, something really mysterious in
setting it up as quite independent of any individual good. Let
me explain. Of course there will always be a limit to what can
be done to illustrate to someone that something is of value when
they are sceptical—for people to recognize the value in something
involves appreciating it in some way which doesn’t necessarily
purely result from a piece of reasoning. Still, for many values,
we can illustrate to someone how it is a value by pointing out
some individual’s life which involves engaging with that thing
as a value, and noting how intelligible that person’s life is. In
the case of welfare, there is no diﬃculty in us recognizing the
personal value of welfare; that is: being moved by concern with
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the welfare of individuals. As Foot stresses—and I have echoed
in the discussion above—welfare so conceived should not be
confused with the value of welfare the utilitarian needs. Still,
we might be thought to understand how the latter is a value
by analogy with the former. And here we have a stark contrast
with equality: as we noted at the outset, equality just isn’t the
kind of thing that an individual can pursue or care about in
isolation within his or her own life. If equality is a value then
it is a value we engage with socially, through our political and
social institutions. So the intrinsic egalitarian has to illustrate to
us that it is intelligible that we pursue equality as a value by
indicating how our institutions and policies could be responsive
to this value. But this takes us back very close to what is already
in dispute: whether we can only understand the kinds of political
ideals and the social policies which egalitarians espouse in the
political realm in terms of a value of equality.
One of the ways of bringing out quite how strange it is to
think of equality as a value has of course long been pressed
through the familiar objection of levelling-down. (Sometimes the
only way to realize equality is through levelling everyone down,
thus making nobody better oﬀ and some worse oﬀ.) However, to
those who press the implausibility of equality as a genuine value
through this objection, intrinsic egalitarians have an answer.
Believing that there is something valuable in a state of aﬀairs
in which things are equal doesn’t mean that one is committed to
equalizing. In Larry Temkin’s oft quoted words:
The non-instrumental egalitarian claims equality is valuable in
itself, even if there is no one for whom it is good. . . . But, the anti-
egalitarian will incredulously ask, do I really think there is some
respect in which a world where only some are blind is worse than
one where all are? Yes. Does this mean I think it would be better
if we blinded everyone? No. Equality is not all that matters. But
it matters some. (Temkin, 2002: 155, slightly reformulated from
Temkin, 1993: 282—the diﬀerence is that the sensible person who
asks for more clariﬁcation is now termed ‘anti-egalitarian’.)
Now some feel that this commitment to a plurality of values
is enough to escape the oddity of the position. ‘Equality matters,
but it is not all that matters’, they repeat sagely. But if not
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silenced by the sheer force of rhetoric, one wants to ask why it
should matter that a state of aﬀairs be more equal than another.
Or to put it in other terms: the answer only works against
the charge that intrinsic egalitarians are committed to realizing
a certain kind of aﬀairs (equalization by levelling down). But
the deeper puzzle is in intrinsic egalitarians ﬁnding something
valuable in these situations in ﬁrst place. Where the utilitarian
can appeal to a value which has some immediate pull on us,
the well-being of individuals, the intrinsic egalitarian appeals to
something much more mysterious: the intrinsic goodness of a
state of aﬀairs in which people are equal (even if this equality
is obtained at the cost of depriving each and all individuals of
some of what they previously possessed).
However intrinsic egalitarians have an answer. The
explanation we seek comes in terms of another value, namely
fairness. Equality matters because fairness matters. Here is what
Temkin says:
Non-instrumental egalitarians care about equality. More speciﬁ-
cally, on my view, they care about undeserved, nonvoluntary,
inequalities, which they regard as bad, or objectionable, because
unfair. Thus, the non-instrumental egalitarian thinks it is bad, or
objectionable, to some extent—because unfair—for some to be
worse oﬀ than others through no fault or choice of their own.
(Temkin: 2002, 129–130, stress in the original.)
This way of putting things may have initial appeal, but on
reﬂection it really should leave one even more puzzled. Not only
is it unclear why fairness should matter in itself (this clariﬁcation
just pushes the puzzle one step back), it is also quite unclear
why fairness should be invoked at all. Yet the discussion is not
normally pushed beyond this point. So in what ways can fairness
be invoked without raising controversy?
Fairness is an important virtue, and there are situations which
demand that an agent acts fairly. Fairness so conceived is a virtue
of the way in which one acts: it is a procedural value of acts
or decisions. Though fairness may be a moral requirement on an
agent in a particular situation, it cannot be a goal of action, a
state of aﬀairs to be promoted (apart from, that is, the irrelevant
end here of promoting people being fair in their decisions and
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actions). And on the face of it there is something puzzling in
thinking of justice as a duty to repair inequalities which are
termed ‘unfair’, if we cannot point out to the agent or the process
which introduced them ‘unfairly’.
One might recommend (as Rawls famously does) that we
think of principles of just distribution from an initial position
of fairness in which parties to a contract cannot introduce an
arbitrary bias in the agreement reached. (The thought parallels
Rousseau’s view that we should abstract from human-made
inequalities which we have come to ﬁnd ‘natural’, and start from
a hypothetical state of nature in which they do not exist.) But
this is still to think of fairness as a procedural virtue. It would be
a mistake to deduce that this commits us to envisaging fairness
as the outcome or state of aﬀairs we should arrive at, and to
believing that justice is fairness. That Rawls is so often thought to
be committed to just this seems to me a mistake. He wrote: ‘[T]he
name “justice as fairness” . . . conveys the idea that the principles
of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. The
name does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are
the same, any more than the phrase “poetry as metaphor” means
that the concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same’ (Rawls,
1999: 11).
Be this as it may, the idea that it is bad, because unfair, that
some be worse oﬀ than others through no fault of their own has
a strong initial intuitive grip on us. But are we really moved by
fairness? I think that there might be another explanation. For
consider the following example:
A small, fantastically prosperous, community is such that each
and all of its members have more than enough to live extremely
well, to meet not only their needs but to take advantage of
opportunities open to them and to exercise talents they decide
to develop. Still wealth varies within the community from these
who have more than enough to those who have several times
more than enough. This unequal distribution is the result of luck
rather than individual choice or eﬀort.
This is just the kind of distribution which some intrinsic
egalitarians are inclined to call ‘unfair’, for there is inequality,
and it does not result from personal choice or desert. Yet the
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intuitive grip that fairness might have had on us in a world
with some fundamental individual needs unmet does not seem
nearly as pressing in these heavenly circumstances. One may even
think that there would be some fetishism involved in insisting
on equalizing in such conditions. It would also appear strangely
moralistic to call ‘bad’ the attitude of these who, having more
than others, yet do not feel an impulse to redistribute towards
the less fortunate, for these are still very fortunate: they have
more than enough.
What this suggests is that fairness becomes extremely
important solely in conditions of scarcity. This would also
explain the common, but on the face of it perplexing, rider that
inequalities suﬀered by the worst oﬀ matter fundamentally, but
solely when it is ‘through no fault or choice of their own’. The
thought might be this. Where in a community some individual
needs are unmet, it would seem selﬁsh of these who are better oﬀ
not to devote resources to those whose well-being is adversely
aﬀected. Given conditions of relative scarcity which prevail in
all human societies, common resources devoted to this purpose
will not meet every need that there is. So we must have a fair
procedure to attribute resources. In particular, it would seem
unfair for some to demand a share of scarce resources (and thus
deprive others in dire conditions) if they could do without.10
If this is right, though, what matters fundamentally is neither
equality nor fairness, but individual needs. Fairness regains its
place as a procedural virtue for institutional agents responsible
for adjudicating the distribution of goods. We should hold oﬀ,
that is, embracing intrinsic egalitarianism. Does this mean that
we should just give up egalitarianism as a political doctrine
and repudiate the political ideal of equality? As I have already
indicated I think there is no need to take this course. We can
make sense of someone being an egalitarian in a political sense,
who is moved just by values that we ﬁnd intelligible within the
personal domain—I have in mind principally the recognition of
the welfare and needs of others that engages our benevolence.
What would make such a view egalitarian is not the distinctive
10. For a development of the idea of a reasonable threshold of demands on others
see my ‘The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons’,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 105 (2005).
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values the view is grounded in, but rather the political policies
one is moved towards—namely the espousal of policies with
are equalizing in their eﬀects, that lead to re-distributions which
are more equal than the current status quo. To make sense of
this is to see how there can be a distinctive role for political
institutions in relation to equality without there having to be a
role for equality as a value. This is to return us to the debate
with which we started, and Cohen’s complaint against Rawls.
Before applying ourselves back to Scheﬄer’s debate with Cohen,
though, we need to draw out a little more issues of values,
principles and policies of distribution.
V
Earlier in this paper I distinguished between several aspects of
utilitarianism. In particular, I made a distinction between its
postulating a metaphysics of value through the comparison of
state of aﬀairs (in terms of how they fare with regard to overall
welfare), and a more direct political impulse, grounded in the
concern for well-being of others. Now we have re-encountered
claims of needs of other individuals as the source of the current
egalitarian concern with fairness. Can a political egalitarianism
rooted in this important impulse be deﬁned? And if so, can it
escape the ways in which political utilitarianism becomes self-
defeating? I think that such an account might be sketched,
and to this I will turn at the end of this section. But ﬁrst let
me remove a misunderstanding that might arise regarding the
political implications of egalitarianism.
It is very tempting to think that the divide between theoretical
positions is located in the policies of distribution which
ensue from the principles they deﬁne. Egalitarians start from
the assumption that principles or values advocated by other
perspectives support less strictly egalitarian distributions than
a proper concern for equality would recommend. The thought
would be that an egalitarian society is to be distinguished by
the preparedness of individuals to give more to others, and to
be more responsive to claims of needs of others, for example
because their actions are more fully informed by an egalitarian
ethos. But tempting as this is, it is a mistake. To see this, it is
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useful to envisage policies advocated by intrinsic egalitarians and
by their opponents.11 Take as an example of the latter Frankfurt’s
stance against the moral worth of equality and in favour of
suﬃciency.12 (Frankfurt famously claims that ‘if everyone had
enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had
more than others’; Frankfurt, 1988: 134–35.)
One of the main foci of egalitarian objections to Frankfurt’s
position, it seems to me, is the misconception that his is a political
argument in favour of something like a ‘safety net’ to meet
minimum needs. But Frankfurt himself notes that his concern
with suﬃciency ‘diﬀers from merely having enough to get along,
or enough to make life marginally tolerable’ (1988: 152), that
by ‘enough’ he means ‘enough for a good life, not . . .merely
enough to get by’ (1999: 146), and even that suﬃciency might
lead to prefer an equal distribution, for ‘it might turn out that the
most feasible approach to the achievement of suﬃciency would
be by the pursuit of equality’ (1988: 135). So Frankfurt and the
intrinsic egalitarian might well be arguing for exactly the same
policy, namely an equal distribution.13 They just would do it for
diﬀerent reasons.
Still, critics who accuse Frankfurt of not being suﬃciently
egalitarian could have a diﬀerent thought, namely that, in some
circumstances, an inegalitarian distribution will be consistent
with Frankfurt’s principles. However, a moment’s reﬂection
should show that this can’t be a cogent criticism either, for as
our discussion of the levelling down objection highlighted, even
the proudest intrinsic egalitarians do not advocate egalitarian
11. On the question of policies advocated by egalitarians, compare Samuel Scheﬄer’s
analysis of the striking rise of luck-egalitarianism during the period in which welfare-
state liberal societies have become much less redistributive (Scheﬄer 2003).
12. For an illuminating discussion of the idea of equality which shares some elements
with Frankfurt’s position see Joseph Raz (Raz, 1986).
13. Note that in his second article devoted to the idea of equality and respect
Frankfurt goes even further in meeting egalitarian concerns, for he highlights that
someone can be legitimately oﬀended by inegalitarian treatment, though he is ‘quite
satisﬁed that he has as much of everything as he can use’ (Frankfurt, 1999: 150).
The thought is that this inequality of condition might still be objectionable, though
suﬃciency is met, if there is an agent responsible for this discrepancy, and that agent
failed to distribute advantages and/or disadvantages treating each person with respect
(that is: impartially and without arbitrariness). Frankfurt’s point is that still, in this
case, the claim of equality is derivative: it is grounded in the more fundamental moral
notions of respect and impartiality.
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policies of distribution in all circumstances. (Otherwise they
would exhort us always to level down.)
Thus intrinsic egalitarians might appear threatened by a
dilemma: if what makes them egalitarians is the intrinsic worth
of equality, then they are only egalitarians if, and when, they
say that the right thing to do is to level down. Whereas if
they remain neutral as to what the right thing to do all things
considered is, then it seems that they have no ground to say
that Frankfurt isn’t an egalitarian. As we have seen, intrinsic
egalitarians escape this dilemma by saying that to be egalitarian
is to be moved by equality itself, as well as by other values. But
that this seems the sensible thing to say to show that Frankfurt
is not properly egalitarian only comes from thinking that there is
some claim equality has on us which is more than what Frankfurt
endorses. There must therefore be something other than the
political policies aimed at meeting claims of suﬃciency, policies
of which Frankfurt is, as we have seen, happy to concede that
they might be best achieved through pursuing equality. Now the
commitment to something more is precisely what is puzzling
(in a way utilitarianism is not). This is what the example of
levelling down highlights: the concern is not just whether there
are other values which make us refrain from levelling down. The
real problem is ﬁnding the worth in levelling down such that we
have to be restrained from it.
What this brings out is that there tends to be a conﬂation of
principles and policies as the focus of egalitarian debate. One
has to decide: is one an egalitarian because one advocates an
egalitarian policy of distribution in the actual world, or must there
rather be a distinctive set of principles which justify policies of
distribution in an egalitarian way for any possible circumstance?
As we have been discussing intrinsic egalitarianism, it seems to
be focussed on the later (the commitment to equality per se,
regardless of circumstances). But the justiﬁcation for this leads
to a questionable metaphysics of value, and seems to confuse
a concern for fair distribution of scarce resources in the actual
world with fairness as a desirable outcome. By thus framing the
issue, intrinsic egalitarians present us with the unattractive choice
of either being termed ‘anti-egalitarians’ or embracing levelling
down (a type of equalization which would deserve Hume’s words
that ‘however specious these ideas of perfect equality may seem,
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they are really, at bottom, impracticable; and were they not so,
would be extremely pernicious to human society’14).
Ironically, this unpalatable alternative is also the one we
are presented with by critics of intrinsic egalitarians such as
Frankfurt, for these see no need to stress that one can be
moved by egalitarian concerns even where one is sceptical of
the foundations of intrinsic egalitarianism. That is: both sides
of this debate about the metaphysics of value have chosen
to associate the term ‘egalitarianism’ just with a controversial
attitude within ethics proper. And the regrettable result is that
so few people seem to recognise the natural demand to connect
this debate within philosophy with what has actually moved
people in political action when they have been stirred by talk
and thought of equality. Yet it is important to recognize how
people in being moved to political action can genuinely have a
concern with equality in that context, and how such motivation
can be intelligible independent of any ethical controversy.
I think this now puts in our hands the resources to address the
debate with which we started between G. A. Cohen, on one side,
and Rawls and Scheﬄer, on the other. Cohen’s criticism now
appears ambiguous between two quite diﬀerent concerns. The
ﬁrst concern, which is shared by liberal egalitarians, is that it is
possible to imagine policies quite diﬀerent from the ones we do
have, policies which redistribute more to the least well-oﬀ and
take less seriously the self-interested motivations of those who
have a lot. As Scheﬄer and others have pressed, and as I have
just highlighted through a diﬀerent route, this concern is not well
grounded. Intrinsic egalitarians, suﬃcientists a` la Frankfurt, and
liberal egalitarians may all be committed to exactly the same
policies of distribution in the real world; and sometimes these
policies will be ones of equal distribution. It is also open to
all of these diﬀerent ethical viewpoints to argue for distributive
equality for reasons others than the mere possession of goods,
say to foster what Rawls calls the social bases of self-respect.
(I take it that this is what some people mean by the importance
of equality of status.) But in these further cases the claim of
equality is still merely derivative, and grounded in attention
14. Hume, David, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section 3, Part 2,
¶26, stress in the original.
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to needs or respect for persons, not in the value of equality
per se.
This suggests that Cohen might have a second, quite diﬀerent,
concern in mind: namely, that while the policies of redistribution
argued for by liberal egalitarians such as Rawls or Scheﬄer
might be quite just; still, compatible with this, self-seeking
entrepreneurs within such a society could fail to aﬃrm the
importance of equality, thereby indicating a less than good
society. They do not, that is, aﬃrm the right principles, even if
they give willy-nilly to support the right policies, and hence the
right distribution. Now this seems to commit us to the view that
it is the role of society to educate people in what really matters,
even if we derive enough from them to meet the need of all. (This
thought might then be what underpins the talk of the need for an
‘egalitarian ethos’.) Of course some will be happy to embrace this
view, but I take it that it constitutes quite an illiberal thought,
one which need not form part of the political ideal of equality.
If the principal political impetus for egalitarianism is the desire
to meet the claims of the needy, why should we also be focused
on the task of re-education, when those less concerned with the
claims of the poor are still resigned to contribute their bit to their
welfare?
That is to say, we can see the dialectic developed between
Cohen, Rawls and Scheﬄer like this. Cohen complains that
Rawls does not do enough to recognize the value of equality as a
value for individuals—consistent with the basic structure, there
may be people who pursue their own self-interest and care not
at all for equality. Scheﬄer responds, that the liberal egalitarian
can indeed recognize the importance of equality as a value for
individuals: it is just that the way in which we engage with this
value is through creating institutions which seek to maintain
equality among people, in such a way that these people can
also properly pursue their more personal aims and goals. At the
outset, I suggested that this wouldn’t satisfy Cohen. He could still
complain that the just society might harbour individuals who do
not properly respect the value of equality, if the institutions are
concerned solely with maintaining equal distributions. That is to
say, he seems to suggest that a just society should be concerned to
create institutions which seek to maintain equality but which also
seek to inculcate a proper appreciation or respect of this value.
April 29, 2005 Time: 10:54am darde.tex
the division of moral labour 283
In the discussion above, I have suggested a somewhat blunter
rejection of Cohen’s challenge. Where Cohen goes wrong, I
have argued, is in supposing that we should value equality in
itself in the ﬁrst place, and hence that we should explain the
appropriateness of the institutions we construct by reference
to this value. What should move us towards favouring equal
distributions are concerns which can be found just within each
person’s pursuit of a good life: recognizing the claims of need
that others have on us. From this perspective, there need be no
further value which our institutions have to embody in order for
them to express an egalitarian outlook. Of course, we may add,
the society which results may contain many individuals whose
outlook fails to reﬂect what we think a good agent ought to care
about. But it is doubtful that a liberal egalitarian would then
conclude that what we should engage in is the re-education of
these people the same set of concerns that we have.
Intrinsic egalitarians have written as if there is no way for
equality to be of value to us unless it is of intrinsic value. In
this context, the question ‘Why value equality?’ has become the
question what form of consequentialism should we endorse. A
consequence is that where one might have expected an echo of
political debate about the demands and limits of equality, one
ﬁnds instead a purely theoretical debate about the existence of
certain kinds of value and what can show us that the structure
of states of aﬀairs or the presence of fairness should matter to
us in itself. In eﬀect: they seem to have undermined the political
appeal of equality, and thus, contrary to their intention, the very
possibility of a widespread egalitarian ethos.
My alternative suggestion is this. A properly political form of
egalitarianism, one which is less creative in the values it posits to
justify its principles, is liable to generate egalitarian distributive
policies in the actual world (and in relevantly similar worlds).
We can conceive of equality as an ideal drawing on an individ-
ualized ethics as opposed to consequentialist concerns (that is,
as based in our concern for other individuals rather than as an
essentially consequentialist value which has to be constrained by
our respect for other individuals). So thinking of equality is to
locate its appeal for us directly in the political domain. We are to
think of equality as a political not metaphysical concern. That is
to say that in engaging with equality we are not to suppose that
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some additional value whose nature and status may be a matter
of ethical controversy need be introduced. Rather on the basis
of values which are already entirely intelligible to us, we can be
moved to demand equality among people in actual circumstances
of scarcity and claims of need. Egalitarianism is rooted in our
concern for the needs of other individuals; its values should be
these things which can impact on a point of view that an individ-
ual occupies, things that can intelligibly matter to individuals.
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